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Abstract 
 This paper presents three demographic models useful for 
projections of social sector demand. The first model is a probabilistic 
national population forecast based on the collective experience of UN 
member states. It offers a set of probabilistic forecasts as a 
complement to the official UN scenario forecasts. The second model 
forecasts the population by age and educational level using data from a 
single census. Forecasts are presented for Chile which show dramatic 
changes in the educational composition of the elderly population and 
in the working-age population in the near future. These trends are 
likely to have important implications for reductions in poverty and 
future economic growth. The third model examines the effects of 
changes in population age structure on social sector demand. As an 
example, some likely effects of population aging on the Chilean 
government budget are examined. Each of the 3 models presented in 
this paper are based on relatively simple accounting frameworks. 
Though simple, the models provide interesting insights into the future 
demography of countries and the economic and fiscal implications of 
these changes. 
.
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I. The Random Country Model for 
Probabilistic Population 
Forecasts 
Most national population forecasts are based on expert opinion 
about the likely future course of mortality, fertility, and immigration. 
The forecaster uses his or her knowledge about social, economic, and 
cultural forces to develop scenarios about the future demography of 
the country of interest. Typically, three scenarios are evaluated: a 
baseline scenario which represents the forecaster’s best guess about 
the future and a high and a low scenario bracketing the baseline 
forecast which are generally viewed as providing some sense of 
uncertainty around the baseline forecast.  
These traditional scenario forecasts have been criticized on 
several grounds (Lee and Tuljapurkar, 1994 and Keilman, Pham, and 
Hetland, 2002). First, expert opinion is often biased. In particular, 
experts are usually too pessimistic about future gains in life 
expectancy. That is, national forecasts have consistently overstated 
future mortality rates – resulting in underestimation of the elderly 
population. Experts also appear to be biased in forecasting fertility in 
that they are unduly influenced by the recent past. When fertility is 
high, they tend to forecast continued high fertility. When fertility is 
low, they tend to forecast continued low fertility.  
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Second, high-low scenarios provide an inconsistent measure of our uncertainty over the 
length of the forecast. Typically, they are too narrow in the first years of the forecast and too wide 
in the last years of the forecast. This is due to the fact that although fertility might be unusually 
high for a few years in a row, it is exceedingly improbable that it would remain unusually high in 
every year of the forecast. Therefore, forecasters using scenarios are confronted with a difficult 
dilemma: the high scenario must be high enough in the early years to account for a chance run of 
several years worth of “high” values – but the high scenario should must be lower over the long-run 
reflecting the fact that such a chance run for every year of the forecast is exceedingly unlikely. The 
high-low scenario approach does not account for the cancellation of unusually high and unusually 
low values over the course of the simulation.  
In a similar vein, the scenarios must couple together the same set of extreme values for each 
of the three components of mortality, fertility, and immigration in every year of the simulation. For 
example, in the high population scenario, the forecaster typically couples high fertility with high 
immigration and low mortality in every year of the forecast. The forecasts ignore other possible 
combinations. This leads to inconsistent prediction intervals across different variables of interest. 
Some demographers have proposed the use of stochastic population forecasts as a means of 
overcoming these difficulties. Long historical series of data on fertility, mortality, and immigration 
are analyzed and forecast using time-series methods. Monte Carlo methods based on repeated 
draws from distributions defined by the time-series estimates provide thousands of population 
projections which define prediction intervals. This method clearly addresses the problem of 
inconsistent prediction intervals in traditional high-low scenario forecasts. However, it is less clear 
to what extent these stochastic models overcome the key problem of expert bias. Indeed, it is 
frequently the practice in such models to replace the central forecast of the time-series model with 
a forecast provided by expert opinion.  
In this report, I present a new method for probabilistic population forecasts which I call the 
Random Country Model (RCM). The RCM approach differs in some key respects from those 
models developed by Lee and Tuljapurkar (1994), the United States Congressional Budget Office 
(2001), and the United States Social Security Administration (2005). Those models are all based on 
time-series analysis, while the Random Country Model is based on a non-parametric sampling 
technique.  
Those models analyze data for a single national population. The Random Country Model is 
based on the collective experience of 192 UN member countries. Those models stress the unique 
historical experience of the country of interest, while the RCM approach stresses the shared 
experience of countries. For example, in forecasting the future path of the total fertility rate, RCM 
assumes that UN member countries with similar Total Fertility Rates are being exposed to the same 
set of unknown social forces which shape their future demographic trajectory. By contrast, a 
forecast based on expert judgment uses (implicitly or explicitly) information about these social 
forces and their future impacts. Examples of such factors include the one child family policy in 
China, the anti-smoking campaigns in California, national immigration laws, changing educational 
distributions, changing labor force demand, etc.  
Typically, those traditional models analyze a very long time series of data which span 50 to 
100 years. In contrast, I am using a sample of convenience: the UN data set on World Population 
Prospects (2004) which includes data for the period 1950 through 2005. This post-1950 historical 
record misses some of the 1940s baby boom experienced in the US and several other countries. In 
addition, it includes the experience of many countries which never experienced the post-war baby 
boom. Therefore, the stochastic forecast of fertility based on the UN post-1950 experience will be 
less likely to predict baby booms than stochastic forecasts based solely on US historical data.  
CEPAL - SERIE población y desarrollo N° 66 
11 
Finally, those traditional probability forecasts frequently replace the time-series prediction of 
central tendency with an alternative forecast based on expert judgment. In contrast, the Random 
Country Model uses the central tendency revealed by the historical experience of UN member 
countries rather than replacing that central tendency with a forecast based on expert judgment. Of 
course, there are many plausible reasons for expecting that the future will be radically different 
than the past. Nevertheless, it is useful to begin with the null hypothesis that the future will be like 
the past. In evaluating our scenarios against the backdrop of these probabilistic forecasts, we are 
prodded to think carefully about what novel forces will interrupt the continuity of past trends, or 
what conditions in our country of interest make it unique and unlikely to share the common 
experience of UN member countries. 
In his Theory of Justice, the philosopher John Rawls (1971) posits that the ideal just society 
would be created under conditions in which the participants constructed a social contract behind a 
“veil of ignorance” in which they were unaware of what role they would subsequently play in the 
society. This veil of ignorance was a crucial element in Rawl’s scheme in order to remove the bias 
of the participants. In a similar manner, these probabilistic forecasts are undertaken behind a veil of 
ignorance in which we purposively strive to remove the biases that form the basis of expert 
opinion. 
The Random Country Model is based solely on 4 characteristics of the country in question. 
These 4 country-specific factors are the total fertility rate (TFR), life expectancy at birth for both 
sexes combined (e0), the net migration rate (NMR), and the population count by age and sex. The 
Random Country Model uses the collective experience of 192 UN member countries over the 55 
year period from 1950 to 2005 in order to forecast the future trajectories of fertility, mortality, and 
migration. The Random Country Model using only these 4 factors as starting0020proceeds to 
generate 1,000 population forecasts. For any variable of interest, at any point in time, we have a list 
of 1,000 possible values. The sorted list for a particular variable defines our probability interval for 
that variable. For example, we have 1,000 possible values for the total population in the year 2050. 
Table 1 presents a summary of these values for Chile. In 2050, half of our 1,000 population 
forecasts lie above 21.9 million and half below. Less than 5% of our forecasts lie above 27.5 
million and less than 5% lie below 17.6 million. Or in other words, our probabilistic forecasts 
define a 95% prediction interval for the population of Chile in 2050 of 17.6 million to 27.5 million 
inhabitants. 
Asian crisis may have been unsound to start with, but the magnitude of the losses associated 
with them were determined even more by the major macroeconomic shocks that these regions 
experienced, which were probably. 
Thus, the investment and savings decisions that determine macroeconomic behaviour and 
performance are based on opinions and expectations on the uncertain evolution of economic 
variables rather than on risk probability distributions that can be known ex-ante. In a word, markets 
are necessarily imperfect when time is involved, as the information necessary to correct such 
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Table 1 
POPULATION OF CHILE IN 2010, 2025, AND 
2050 BASED ON RANDOM COUNTRY 
MODEL FORECAST 
(in millions) 
Percentile 2010 2025 2050 
95th 17.4 21.0 27.5 
75th 17.2 20.1 23.7 
50th 17.2 19.6 21.9 
25th 17.1 19.0 20.3 
5th 16.9 18.3 17.6 
Source: Author’s calculation based on RCM. 
 
These probabilistic forecasts might be considered anti-expert in the sense that we are 
purposively attempting to restrict our expert knowledge about the country we are forecasting. 
These forecasts offer a vision of the future rooted in the past. In that sense, they can be considered 
as the most natural null hypothesis about the future. The variations in demography that we have 
observed in the past serve as our guide to the future. This is not to argue that the future must look 
like the past. But rather that it is useful to begin with this null hypothesis. It will lead to better 
understanding and evaluations of subsequent scenario forecasts based on expert knowledge.  
The Random Country Model consists of 4 key steps: 
• Select path of TFR, e0, and NMR by repeated random draws from a set of similar UN 
member countries. 
• Forecast the population based on the standard cohort component method using the sample 
path of TFR, e0, and NMR. The summary values of TFR, e0, and NMR are translated into 
age-specific values using standardized age patterns of fertility, mortality, and net 
migration. 
• Repeat Steps 1 and 2 numerous times (typically 1,000 or 10,000).  
• Calculate predictive distributions for variables of interest (population size, dependency 
ratios, etc). 
A. Forecasting fertility 
Figure 1 presents the fertility history and fertility projections for each of 192 UN member 
countries for the period 1950 through 2050 based on the UN estimates and scenarios. The data are 
based on 5 year intervals for the Total Fertility Rate (TFR). The left side of the graph represents the 
historical record and the right side the UN scenario forecasts. The central feature of the historical 
record has been the decline in fertility. This is more evident when we present the data as a density 
distribution. Figure 2 shows the distribution of TFRs by deciles. In 1950, half of UN member 
countries had TFR above 6.0. By 2005, less than 10% had a TFR above 6.0. The median TFR had 
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Figure 1 
TOTAL FERTILITY RATE BY COUNTRY: 1950 TO 2050 
Source: UN (2005). 
 
 
Using UN data from 1950-2005 we have 192 countries with 11 observations each, for a total 
of 2,112 TFR values. In the Random Country Model, the derivation of the sample path of TFR 
proceeds as follows. Imagine the starting year TFR is 7.0. I then select 100 of the TFR values 
which are closest to 7.0. From this group of TFRs, I randomly select one value. I then observe what 
happened in that country in the following 5 year period. This value represents our prediction of 
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Figure 2 























Source: Author’s calculation based on UN (2005). 
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Source: Author’s calculation based on RCM. 
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Figure 4 






















Source: Author’s calculation based on RCM. 
 
 
One key issue with this sampling strategy is how to define similar countries. I have chosen to 
define similarity by selecting the 100 points with TFRs closest to our country of interest. One could 
also define similarity in terms of some fixed value: for example, all those countries whose TFR is 
within 0.25 of our country of interest. 
Another issue in this approach involves the extent to which the current level of fertility is 
influenced by the past levels of fertility. This model assumes that the current level of fertility is 
only influenced by the most recent period fertility. Similarly, this approach assumes that, for the 
purposes of prediction, the experience of countries in the 1950s is just as relevant as the experience 
of countries in the 1990s.  
The experience of countries before 1950 is completely ignored in the forecast. I am using the 
post-1950 period based on a sample of convenience: the UN data begin in 1950. Events such as the 
post-war baby boom of the 1940s are not recorded in the UN historical record and so are not 
represented in the forecast. This is one reason why my probabilistic forecasts of TFR have much 
smaller probability intervals than those generated by Lee-Tuljapurkar who base their forecast on a 
long time series of US data. Lee-Tuljapurkar 95% prediction interval for the TFR of the United 
States in 2050 are centered on 1.95 and span the range from a high of nearly 3.0 to a low of 0.8. In 
contrast, my 95% prediction interval for the TFR of the U.S. in 2050 span the range from a high of 
2.4 to a low of 1.5 --- approximately half the width of the Lee-Tuljapurkar prediction interval. 
In addition, Lee-Tuljapurkar methods for forecasting TFR use probabilistic methods only to 
define the variation about a trend and not the trend itself. Time-series methods are used to fit the 
historical series of the TFR. Were these same methods used to predict the TFR, the prediction 
would have a mean equal to that of the historical series (since the time-series is fit to a mean de-
trend series). In the Lee-Tuljapurkar method, instead of using the historical long run average, the 
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trend itself is based on expert judgment about the likely future course of the TFR. So for example 
in the US, a long-run average of 1.95 is used in the Lee-Tulja forecast. By contrast, the Random 
Country Model is based on the experience of UN member countries. As is evident in Figures 1 and 
2, the central feature of the fertility experience has been the fertility transition from high to low 
fertility levels. So, my probabilistic forecast will reflect this movement. If a country starts with a 
high level of TFR, repeated random draws from the sample of TFRs will lead to a repeat of the 
historical experience of the fertility transition. Figure 3 shows the first 100 sample TFR paths for a 
hypothetical country with an initial TFR of 6.0. Figure 4 shows the predictive distribution for 1,000 
sample TFR paths. 
What about the “post-transition” fertility levels? In practice, my method will lead to a long-
run forecast of TFR based on the 100 lowest TFR points. The average of these 100 lowest TFR 
countries for the 1950-2005 period was 1.5. However, based on analysis by Bongaarts and Feeney 
(1998) we believe that some of these TFRs are transient values generated by a switch in fertility 
patterns from early to late childbearing. The switch leads to a temporary depression in the level of 
TFR in the range of 0.2 to 0.3 children. That is, after all cohorts have transitioned to the new 
childbearing pattern, the period TFR would rise by 0.2 to 0.3 children. Therefore, the low fertility 
of many UN member states observed in the data can reasonably be expected to represent 
transitional states and should not serve as the basis of our long run forecasts. Some adjustment in 
the TFR forecast is needed. At the moment, I have simply assumed that tempo effects are currently 
about 0.25 births and will dissipate within a generation. This method leads to a long-run future in 
which all countries will converge to a similar low-level of fertility of 1.85 births per women. This 




TOTAL FERTILITY RATE FOR CHILE IN 2050 COMPARING UN FORECAST 
WITH RANDOM COUNTRY MODEL (RCM) FORECAST 
Forecast     
Low Middle High Range UN Forecast 
(TFR in 2050) 1.35 1.85 2.35 1.00 
 
    
 5th Percentile Median 95th Percentile Range 
RCM Forecast  
(TFR in 2050) 1.43 1.80 2.34 0.91 
RCM Forecast 
(Average TFR from 
2005 to 2050) 
1.62 1.83 2.33 0.71 
Source: UN (2005) and author’s calculations based on RCM. 
 
 
At this point, I have implemented the UN probabilistic forecast in only 3 countries: Chile, 
Brazil, and the United States. So, I must be cautious in generalizing the results. But it appears that 
the UN high-low TFR forecasts are quite close to my 95% TFR forecasts for estimates of the 
annual TFR. Table 2 presents the comparison of UN scenario forecasts and my Random Country 
Model probabilistic forecasts for 2050. From this we can draw two conclusions. First, the UN 
fertility forecasts are quite consistent with the historical experience of UN member countries. 
Second, the UN high-low TFR forecasts most likely represent year-to-year extremes which might 
be expected to cancel over time. That is, fertility is unlikely to be consistently high or consistently 
low as predicted by the UN forecasts. Instead, as the RCM forecast indicates, average TFRs over 
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the length of the forecast would fall in a more narrow range. This means that the UN high-low 
population forecasts define a range of births much larger than the experience of UN member 
countries would indicate. However, this effect will mainly be seen at the end of the UN forecast in 
2050 – when we become increasingly skeptical of the validity of the historical experience in 
forecasting the future. Figure 5 compares the UN scenario forecasts of the Chilean population 
under age 20 to my UN probabilistic forecasts. The effects of these differences in TFR are clearly 
evident in 2050. 
Figure 5 
POPULATION UNDER AGE 20 IN CHILE: 1950 TO 2100 BASED ON HISTORICAL 























Source: UN (2005) and author’s calculations based on RCM. 
 
 
The Total Fertility Rate is defined as the sum of the age-specific fertility rates. I translate the 
forecast of TFR into a set of age-specific rates based on a Lee type transformation in which we 
define a base-level set of age-specific fertility rates (ax) and a second set of transforming factors 
(bx) which are added to the ax factors in multiples of k so as to reach the target TFR level. That is, 
age-specific fertility is defined as: 
 
f(x) = a(x) + k* b(x). 
 
So, we have a one-parameter family of age-specific fertility schedules defined by the single 
parameter k and the fixed age schedules of ax and bx. In the current implementation of the model, I 
am using ax and bx values derived from time-series analysis of historical US data. In subsequent 
versions of the model I will attempt to use UN data to derive ax and bx values based on two sets of 
age-specific fertility rates: a high set based on member countries with TFRs above 5 and a low set 
with TFRs below 2.5.  
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B. Forecasting mortality 
Like fertility, the sample path for life expectancy in the Random Country Model is selected 
based on the experience of UN member countries from 1950 to 2005. Figure 6 below shows this 
experience along with the UN forecasts for the period 2005-2050. 
 
Figure 6 
LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH BY COUNTRY: 1950 TO 2050 






















Source: UN (2005). 
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LIFE EXPECTANCY DISTRIBUTION BY DECILES: 1950 TO 2050 





















Source: Author’s calculation based on UN (2005). 
 
 
As evident in Figure 7, the defining feature of this experience has been the general upward 
trend in life expectancy which characterizes the mortality transition. In 1950-54, median life 
expectancy among countries was 49 years. Within 50 years, median life expectancy had risen to 70 
years.  
The derivation of the sample path of e0 proceeds as follows. Imagine the starting year e0 is 
70. I then select 100 e0 values which are closest to 70. From this group of countries, I randomly 
select one country. I then observe what happened in that country in the following 5 year period. 
This value represents our prediction of the change in e0 for the forecast. For example, e(0) may 
have increased by 1 year in the 5 year period. So, we add 1 year to the current e(0) in our country 
of interest and this forms our projection of e(0) for the next 5 year period. We now have a country 
in which e(0) is 71. We then repeat the process for the length of the forecast.  
Owing to the upward trend in the data, all countries will eventually reach into the higher 
ranges of e(0). How then should we make predictions for e(0) projections in these higher ranges 
and beyond? My solution is to use the experience of UN member countries whose e(0) lies above 
75 – representing 161 observation points. These countries, on average, experienced gains in life 
expectancy of about 1 year in every 5 year period or about 0.2 years annually. There are no signs in 
the historical data that we are approaching any limits to life expectancy. Therefore, my forecasts 
based on the observed historical experience will also show no signs of approaching a limit. Of 
course, one may well argue that there is no historical record for countries with life expectancy 
beyond 90 – so there is no historical basis on which to make such forecasts.  
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Figure 8 shows the average annual gains in life expectancy based on the historical experience 
of UN member countries as a solid line. The dashed line in the graph represents the average gains 
based on the UN forecast. Two key differences emerge between the historical experience and the 
UN scenario forecast: at lower levels of e(0) the UN forecasts much more rapid increases than 
observed historically – plausibly due to faster catch-up growth in the future. At the higher levels of 
e(0), the UN forecasts much slower growth in e(0) than has been observed historically. This growth 
is about half as fast as historically observed. This projected slowdown is curious and I suspect it 
may be an unintended consequence of other assumptions in the UN scenario forecasts. For 
example, imagine that they explicitly or implicitly assume a limit to life expectancy. Then in order 
to avoid a situation in which high life expectancy countries exceed such limits, they must posit 
slowed gains in e(0) at very high life expectancies. It would be natural, then, to simply assume 
some graduation in rates of improvements from the very rapid improvements seen in countries with 
life expectancy in the 60s to their assumed slow rate of gains for countries as they approach limits 
to life expectancy. Because the Random Country Model is based on the trends observed in the 
historical experience, it forecasts gains in life expectancy at twice the rate projected by the UN. 
Another interesting result evident in Figure 8 is the low life expectancy gains of a group of 
countries with life expectancy in the low 70s. 
 
Figure 8 
GAINS IN LIFE EXPECTANCY AS A FUNCTION 
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Figure 9 
LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH IN CHILE: 1950 TO 2050 BASED ON HISTORICAL 



























Source: UN (2005) and author’s calculation based on RCM. 
 
 
The Random Country Model uses the UN historical record and so leads to a future in which 
life expectancy in all countries will be increasing at the same long-run rate of 0.22 years annually. 
That is, there is a convergence to the same rate of increase. This implies that, in general, there is no 
“catch-up” growth by lagging countries to leading countries within group of high life expectancy 
countries (e0>75). However, there is considerable “catch-up” growth for countries below this 
threshold as evident in Figure 8. Countries with life expectancy in the 50s and 60s have been 
improving life expectancy at about twice the pace of countries with life expectancy above age 70. 
In the current implementation of the model, the life expectancy forecast of all high life expectancy 
countries are based on random draws from the same underlying distribution -- no matter when a 
country passes the high life expectancy threshold of 75. Therefore, in general there will be no long-
run convergence among high life expectancy countries. The countries should largely maintain their 
positions based on when they cross the high life expectancy threshold. For example, life 
expectancy in the US is predicted to be higher than that of Chile over the next 100 years, simply 
because the US had higher life expectancy than Chile at the start of the simulation.  
Figure 9 shows the probabilistic life expectancy for Chile along with the UN forecast. The 
UN forecast calls for an e(0) of 82.2 by 2050 in Chile. The Random Country Model forecast is 
considerably more optimistic with a median value of 87.3 in 2050, with 95% prediction interval 
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from 84.9 to 89.4. These RCM probabilistic forecasts for Chile predict that the majority of 
Chileans born in 2005 will live to see the 22nd century.  
There are several striking features of the forecasts. First, the UN life expectancy forecast is 
quite a bit below that of the Random Country Model forecast. In fact, by 2025, the UN forecast lies 
below the 95% prediction interval of our model. Based on the historical experience of UN 
countries, we would judge this outcome to be exceedingly unlikely.  
Second, in the RCM forecast life expectancy is increasingly nearly linearly. Oeppen and 
Vaupel (2002) note that record female life expectancy in the life-expectancy leading country has 
been rising over a 160 year period at an annual rate of 0.243 years – while for men it has been 
rising at somewhat slower rate of 0.222. These values are remarkably close to those used in the 
Random Country Model forecast (0.218) based on the recent historical experience of high life 
expectancy countries.  
Based on my probabilistic projections for 3 countries (Chile, Brazil, and the US), I would 
conclude that the UN forecast of life expectancy are unduly pessimistic and represent a distinct 
break with the historical experience of UN member countries. The UN scenario forecast lies well 
below the lower 95% prediction interval for e0 in each of these 3 countries. 
Interestingly, this large difference in life expectancy does not matter much for predicting the 
size of the elderly population in the near-term future. Figure 10 shows the UN probabilistic 
prediction of the population age 65 and older for Chile from 2005-2100 along with the UN scenario 
forecast. For the first 20 years of the forecast, the UN forecast is quite close to my median forecast. 
This reflects two facts: the first is that e(0) forecasts begin at a common point and slowly diverge 
over time. Second, past fertility trends, not life expectancy, are the major determinant of the 
increasing number of elderly. 
Figure 10 
POPULATION AGE 65 AND OLDER IN CHILE: 1950 TO 2100 BASED ON HISTORICAL 






















Source: UN (2005) and author’s calculation based on RCM. 
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Life expectancy at birth is a summary measure of the age-specific mortality rates 
experienced by a population at a point in time. I translate the forecast of e0 into a set of age-
specific rates based on Lee-Carter types transformations in which we define a base-level set of age-
specific mortality rates (ax) and a second set of transforming factors (bx) which are added to the ax 
factors in multiples of k so as to reach the target e(0) level. That is, the log of age-specific mortality 
is defined as: 
 
log(m(x)) = a(x) + k* b(x) 
 
So, we have a one-parameter family of age-specific mortality schedules defined by the single 
parameter k and the fixed age schedules of ax and bx. In the current implementation of the model, I 
am using ax and bx values derived from time-series analysis of historical US data. In subsequent 
versions of the model I will attempt to use UN data to derive ax and bx mortality parameters based 
on two sets of age-specific mortality rates: a high set based on member countries with e0 in the 
range of 50-65 and a low set with e0 above age 75.  
In addition, the current implementation does not take account of the unique age-specific 
mortality rates in the country of interest. Instead, it assumes that all countries with the same life 
expectancy have the same age-specific pattern of mortality. In practice, this means the forecast of 
age-specific mortality rates will represent a distinct break with the historically observed age-
specific mortality rates. An important revision to the current model would be to base the forecast of 
mortality rates on the most recent set of observed mortality rates (as the ax factors), while taking 
the forecast changes in rates based on a common set of bx factors based on either the US data or 
UN member countries as outlined in the preceding paragraph. 
Finally, the forecast is based on the average life expectancy of both sexes combined – rather 
than on separate forecasts for men and women. In future revisions, I should take account of the sex 
difference in mortality in each country and likely changes in this difference over the future.  
C. Forecasting migration 
There is considerable controversy over how to best incorporate assumptions about net 
migration into long run forecasts. Most countries set legal limits on the number of in-migrants. 
Many demographers favor forecasts in which net migration continue at their current level 
throughout the length of the forecast. They argue that this forecast represents a status-quo 
evaluation of current policy. Other demographers point out that legal limits to immigration are 
often “soft limits.” For example, the United States sets strict numerical limits on immigration, but 
certain groups of immigrants (spouses of US citizens) are admitted without limit. Special 
exceptions are often granted for refugee populations. Mass amnesties have been granted for 
legalization of immigrants who entered illegally. In addition, demographers argue that social forces 
shape immigration in the long-run and current legislated limits should be expected to change over 
the course of a long-run forecast. For a recent discussion of these issues in the context of 
forecasting the US population, see Technical Panel on Assumptions and Methods (2003). 
Stochastic population forecasts have generally included only deterministic forecasts of net 
migration. Recently, Miller and Lee (2005) proposed a stochastic forecast for net migrants to the 
U.S. based on a time-series analysis of US immigration. Here, I propose to use the historical data 
for net migration to UN member countries whose population exceed 2.5 million in 1950. I am 
excluding small countries from the sample on the grounds that they are un-representative of most 
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populations – they tend to have dramatic swings in net migration which are extremely uncommon 
in larger populations.  
Figure 11 shows net migration rate by country as observed in the period 1950-2005 and as 
forecast for the period 2005-2050 by the United Nations. When looking at these figures, one is 
struck by the discontinuity between the left and right sides of the graph. On the left side, one sees 
the extreme variability of net migration observed over the past 55 years. On the right side, one sees 
a distinctly orderly pattern of migration. 
Herein lies, one of the strengths of the probabilistic forecast of migration. In the 
deterministic scenario forecasts, demographers are faced with a difficult problem. Despite the past 
variability of net migration, they must forecast only a few paths (low, middle, and high) for future 
net migration. In the probabilistic forecast, this variability observed in the past translates into great 
uncertainty about the future course of migration. This uncertainty about future net migration is not 
hidden from policy makers, but is plainly evident for all to see in the probabilistic forecast. Figure 
12 shows the probabilistic net migration forecast for the United States based on the Random 
Country Model.  
Figure 11 
NET MIGRATION RATE: 1950 TO 2050 BASED ON HISTORICAL 
ESTIMATES AND UN FORECAST 
 
Source: UN (2005). 
  




US HISTORICAL NMR AND FORECAST AVERAGE NET MIGRATION RATE SINCE 2005 
















Source: UN (2005) and author’s calculation based on RCM. 
 
 
The sample paths for the net migration rate are generated in much the same way as fertility. 
One important difference concerns how I select countries similar to the country of interest. I select 
countries whose net migration rate and whose TFR are similar to the country of interest. I am using 
TFR to crudely differentiate countries into low-fertility/receiving countries and high-
fertility/sending countries.  
It does not really make sense to forecast net migration for any country independently of net 
migration of the other countries since immigrants to one country are emigrants from another 
country. That is, we know that net migration for the world must be zero. There is nothing in my 
probabilistic forecasts which guarantees that stochastically generated net migration rates would add 
up to zero when weighted by each country’s population. However, they are being drawn from a 
distribution in which net migration is zero. Another problem with this approach is that we expect 
that over time as more countries complete the demographic transition, sending pressures might 
decrease and lead to reductions in net migration. I have not attempted to model this in any way. 
The net migration rate is a summary measure representing the number of net migrants 
divided by the population size. In order to translate numbers of net migrants into net migrants by 
age, I make use of a standard age distribution of net migrants. I have based this standard age 
distribution on data used by the US Census for its population forecasts. 
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D. Forecasting the population by age and sex. 
In the Random Country Model, these probabilistic forecasts of the total fertility rate, life 
expectancy at birth, and the net migration rate are used to generate 1,000 population forecasts. Each 
population forecasts contains data on the population by single year of age and sex for each year 
from 2005 to 2100. The number of population forecasts is arbitrarily set. In past work, we have 
generally found that the probability bounds defined by 10,000 simulations are similar to those 
defined by 1,000 simulations. The length of the forecast horizon is also arbitrarily set to reach the 
year 2100.  
 
The set of 1,000 population forecasts can be summarized in a number of ways. For example, Figure 
13 shows the probability interval for the total population of Chile. Here we see that the high-low 
probability bounds of the UN forecasts conform closely to the 95% probability interval. Figure 14 
and 15 show the probability interval for the total population of Brazil and the United States. Again, 
we see close correspondence between the 95% probability interval in the Random Country Model 
and the high-low forecast of the UN. 
 
Figure 13 
POPULATION OF CHILE: 1950 TO 2100 BASED ON HISTORICAL 
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Figure 14 
POPULATION OF BRAZIL, 1950 TO 2100 BASED ON HISTORICAL 























Source: UN (2005) and author’s calculation based on RCM. 
 
Figure 15 
POPULATION OF UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1950 TO 2100 BASED ON 




















Source: UN (2005) and author’s calculation based on RCM. 
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E. Summary 
These Random Country Model probabilistic population forecasts use the collective 
experience of UN member countries as the basis for projecting future demographic trends and 
measuring our uncertainty about those trends. Based on this analysis, we can conclude that UN 
scenarios appear to be much more pessimistic about future increases in longevity than past 
experience would indicate. In addition, UN scenarios show much less variation in future net 
migration than past experience would indicate. These characteristics are likely to be common 
features of most national scenario forecasts. So, I suspect that the two biggest surprises countries 
will face in the next few decades will be: (1) a larger than expected elderly populations and (2) 
unexpected shifts in net migration (from net exporter to net importer as well as from high net 
migration to lower net migration).  
There are two important senses in which the probability forecasts can be way off target. 
First, the future may be very unlike the past. As the length of the forecast horizon increases, our 
confidence in the validity of the model decreases. This decrease in confidence in the model is 
distinct from the prediction intervals shown in the graphs. Those prediction intervals only reflect 
our uncertainty about future demographic events under the assumption that our model is valid. 
Second, the model assumes that future events are mainly shaped by social and economic forces 
which countries experience in common. It ignores the uniqueness of countries. For this reason, we 
can find large difference between a probabilistic model which stresses commonality of countries 
and scenario models which typically are stories about the uniqueness of countries.  
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II. Population projection by 
educational level 
In this chapter, I develop a simple method for forecasting the 
population by age, sex, and education level: the Educational Census 
Method. Rather than relying on multiple data sources to derive the 
changes in educational enrollment rates, I use data on educational 
attainment from a single Census. This means that it should be 
relatively easy to generate comparable education forecasts across 
many countries. Chile is used as an illustrative example in which to 
explore the implications of the changing educational composition of 
the working-age population for the size and productivity of the work 
force. 
A. The three box model 
I use a simple three box model to forecast the population by age, 
sex, and education level (Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary). Figure 16 
presents the basic scheme.  
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Figure 16 














The projection model assumes the mortality and fertility are unaffected by education level. In later 
revisions, the model should allow these rates to differ. Migrants are assumed to have the same educational 
distribution as the native population. Population is projected using the cohort-component method. Births are 
assigned to the Primary Education population. At age 16, alpha percent of the Primary Education progress 
to the Secondary Education population. At age 24, beta percent of the Secondary population progress to 
Tertiary population. This model abstracts from the more complex grade-progression ratio method in which 
student populations are forecast by grade level (Lapkoff and Gobalet, 2006).  
B. Estimating alpha and beta progression ratios 
One of the strengths of this simple model is that only two educational parameters need to be 
forecast. Two simple alternative scenarios would be: (1) a No Progress Scenario in which alpha and 
beta progression rates are fixed at their current levels or (2) a Continued Progress Scenario in 
which alpha and beta progression rates continue increasing according to the recent historical trend. 
Estimates for both are easily available using Census data. Figure 17 shows the educational 
distribution of the Chilean population by age and sex based on the Chilean census of 2002. 
Figure 17 
















Source: Author’s calculation based on Chilean Census 2002. 
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Using the census data, we can calculate the percent of the population with at least a 
secondary education by year of birth. This reflects the alpha progression rate, or proportion of 
population progressing from primary to secondary education levels for these birth cohorts. This 
measure is not exactly equivalent to the alpha rate experienced by the cohort – since mortality and 
immigration have altered the educational distribution over time. Figure 18 presents the alpha rate 
for Chilean birth cohorts in the 20th century based on the 2002 Census. The steady progress of the 
educational system over the past 60 years is quite evident.  
 
Figure 18 






















Source: Author’s calculation based on Chilean Census 2002. 
 
 
We present two alternative educational scenarios for Chile. In the No Progress scenario, 
alpha remains fixed at the current value observed in the Census and only 85% of the population 
would progress beyond primary schooling to secondary or beyond. The alternative forecast is based 
on the trend in the last 25 years. In this Continued Progress forecast, the alpha rate reaches its 
maximum rate for cohorts born in the year 2000 and later – showing that Chile has reached 
universal primary school enrollment.  
In a similar fashion, we can use census data to derive the beta progression rate for birth 
cohorts. We define the measure as the ratio of the population with tertiary education to the 
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Figure 19 























Source: Author’s calculation based on Chilean Census 2002. 
 
 
Here, too we note the progress over the century, but a distinct slowdown is evident for 
cohorts born in the late 1950s. Presumably, this was due to disruption of educational system during 
the military overthrow of the civilian government in 1973. Those born in 1955 would have been 18 
in 1973. Apparently, this was a lasting legacy of the installation of a military dictatorship. Once 
those 18 and 19 year olds missed the opportunity to attend college, they were never able to attend 
college subsequently. Another striking feature is that, at the start of the century, women had much 
lower educational attainment than men. But for cohorts born in the last half of the century, men and 
women have had similar educational experiences. 
There are two alternative forecast scenarios for beta, the tertiary progression ratio. In the No 
Progress scenario, the beta rate remains at its current level observed in the census – which in Chile 
means 40% of those with secondary education progress to the tertiary level. In the Continued 
Progress scenario, the beta rate continues to increase based on the trend observed in the last few 
decades. 
C. Shifts in educational distribution among the elderly 
Figures 20 and 21 present the results for forecasting the educational distribution among 
Chilean elderly population from 2002 thru 2100 under our two scenarios. Unsurprisingly, the 
Continued Progress scenario does not begin to diverge from the No Progress scenario until 40 to 50 
years in the future when graduates of today’s educational system turn 65. The main result evident 
in the figures is the rapid change in the educational composition of the elderly population in the 
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next few decades – a reflection of the expansion of the educational system during the 20th century. 
Presumably, this rapid educational transition will have profound implications for the health, wealth, 
and well-being of the elderly population in the future. 
 
Figure 20 
EDUCATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF ELDERLY POPULATION, 



























































EDUCATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF ELDERLY POPULATION, 























Source: Author’s calculation based on Educational Census Method. 
 
 
D. Work force projections 
Like the elderly population, the working-age population (age 25-64) is also projected to 
undergo a dramatic shift in its educational composition. The Continued Progress scenario is 
substantially different from the No Progress scenario in both the short-run as well as the long-run. 
In the No Progress scenario (shown in Figure 22), educational progression rates are fixed at their 
current levels. Over the next 45 years, the educational distribution of the working age population 
(age 20 to 45) continues to change as older, less educated workers and replaced by the younger, 
higher educated workers. Those with secondary education are the largest educational group – 
accounting for nearly one-half of the working-age population. In the Continued Progress scenario 
(shown in Figure 23), educational progression ratios continue to increase at their current trends. In 
this case, those with university education become the largest education group within a few decades 
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Observed cross-sectional correlations between education and employment and wages can be 
used a basis for workforce projection. In cross-sectional data, we observe that those with higher 
education levels are more likely to be employed and are more likely to receive higher wages. Of 
course, correlation does not imply causation and so considerable caution is warranted in using this 
as a basis for projection. On the other hand, there is little doubt that human capital is an important 
driving force of economic development.  
As a first step, I consider the difference in labor force participation rates by age, sex, and 
education level. Figures 24 and 25 present the results for Chilean men and women based on the 
2002 Census. Table 3 summarizes the data in a measure of the expected years of work prior to age 
65 by education level and sex. For example, if a university-educated person experienced the same 
labor force participation rates over their lives as those experienced by university-educated workers 
today, they would work for 34 years on average from birth until age 65. This is the maximum work 
expectancy of any group in Chile. The minimum work expectancy is 10 years -- for women with 
education at the primary level or below. In 1981, a privatized pensions system (AFP) was 
introduced in Chile in which workers save for their own retirement. The government offers a 
“safety net” in that workers who contribute for a minimum of 20 years qualify for a minimum 
pension guarantee. I note in passing that it is clear from Table 3 that woman are at a serious 
disadvantage in qualify for this guarantee. 
 
Figure 24 
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Figure 25 





























EXPECTED YEARS OF WORK BY SEX AND EDUCATION LEVEL, CHILE 2002  
THE EXPECTED YEAR OF WORK RELATIVE TO THOSE OF MEN WITH UNIVERSITY 
EDUCATION IS LISTED IN PARENTHESIS 
Men Women Education level Years Percent Years Percent 
Primary 29 85% 10 29% 
Secondary 32 94% 16 47% 
Tertiary 34 100% 26 77% 
Source: Author’s calculation based on Chilean Census 2002. 
 
The shifts in the educational distribution of the working age population could potentially 
lead to increases in the size of the workforce. Using the labor force participation rates by education 
and sex, I project the changes in the size of the labor force under our two educational scenarios. 
Under the No Education Progress scenario, the changing educational distribution very slightly 
increases the size of the workforce as shown in Figure 26. I also consider a Gender Equality 
scenario in which women’s labor force rates converge to those of men over the next 30 years. In 
this case, we see enormous gains in the size of the workforce. Rather than reaching a plateau in 25 
years of about 6 million workers, the work force continues to increase – reaching nearly 8 million 
workers. In this scenario, about 80,000 additional workers would be entering the work force each 
year for the next 30 years.  
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Figure 26 
WORK FORCE, CHILE 2002-2100 























Source: Author’s calculation based on Educational Census Method. 
 
 
Under the Continued Education Progress scenario, the changing education distribution 
slightly increases the size of the workforce – but its effect is most evident in the latter part of the 
21st century as seen in Figure 27. In contrast, the Gender Equality scenario in which women’s 
labor force participation rates converge to those of men within the next generation shows very 
rapid increases in workforce size. From this analysis, I would conclude that changing educational 
distribution is likely to have only a slight impact on the size of the labor force. If Chile realizes 
rapid growth in its labor force size in the next 30 years, it will be because of the expansion of 
employment opportunities for women in the formal sector. This is not to suggest that education has 
no effect on the labor force. Rather, the main economic payoff from investment in education is 
increases in the productivity of the workforce – rather than an increase in the size of the workforce. 
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WORK FORCE, CHILE 2002-2100 
























Source: Author’s calculation based on Educational Census Method. 
 
 
We can forecast the workforce adjusted for the changing skill level due to the changing 
educational distribution. We might assume that the observed wage differential among different 
education groups reflects differences in worker productivity due to skill level. These differentials 
are large. For example, in the United States workers with university degrees earn 1.75 times as 
much as workers with only secondary education. By differentially weighting each worker by his or 
her education level, we can derive estimates of the effective work force size. Figure 28 presents the 
projection of the effective workforce for Chile. The effective Chilean workforce is projected to 
increase rapidly in the next 40 years – owing to the forecast shifts in the educational distribution. 
These productivity increases are equivalent to adding an additional 50,000 workers per year for the 
next 40 years.  
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Figure 28 
EFFECTIVE WORKFORCE, CHILE 2002-2100 
























Source: Author’s calculation based on Educational Census Method. 
 
 
The scenario results are summarized in Table 4 listing the potential Chilean work force in 
2035. The baseline forecast shows very slow growth in the labor force over the next 30 years – with 
an annual growth rate of about 0.6%. The outlook for economic growth stemming from growth in 
labor supply is bleak. Considering the impact of the changing educational composition of the labor 
force, dramatically changes this outlook. If higher educated workers have higher productivity than 
other workers, then the forecast predicts rapid growth in the labor force in the next generation – of 
1.4% per year. Finally, regardless of the effects of changing educational distributions, increases in 
female labor force participation would have very large effects on the labor force. 
 
Table 4 
POTENTIAL CHILEAN WORK FORCE IN 2035 
 Work force Potential 
Size (Millions) 
Annual Growth Rate 
Scenario: Continued Education Progress 
  Age composition  5.7 0.6% 
  Age and education composition  6.6 1.0% 
  Age and education composition, With productivity effects 7.6 1.4% 
Scenario: Continued Education Progress and Gender Equality 
  Age and education composition  8.1 1.6% 
  Age and education composition, With productivity effects 8.9 1.9% 
Source: Author’s calculation based on Educational Census Method. 
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E. Summary 
This chapter presented a simple two parameter model for forecasting the future population 
by age, sex, and educational level. The strength of this simple approach is that it can be easily used 
to provide forecasts of educational distributions based on educational data collected from a single 
census. It would be easy to apply this model to provide such estimates for all Latin American 
countries. Another feature of the model is that the census data also provides a retrospective look at 
the progress of the educational system over the past 80 years.  
As an example of the model, I forecast the Chilean population by age, sex, and educational 
level from 2002-2100 – under two alternative scenarios: No Education Progress and Continued 
Education Progress. In the example of Chile, we forecast dramatic shifts in the educational 
distribution of the elderly population which may imply equally dramatic changes in pension and 
health programs for the elderly. The forecast also shows the possibility of rapid increases in the 
effective workforce in Chile – reflecting productivity gains due to changes in the educational 
distribution of workers. 
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III. Budget forecasts for key social 
sectors 
In this chapter, I develop a simple model for forecasting the 
impact of shifts in the population age structure on key social sector 
budgets. These 4 are public pensions, education, health, and 
employment. In addition, I examine the broader fiscal and economic 
effects of these demographic changes as reflected in the fiscal tax ratio 
and the economic support ratio. Chile is used as an illustrative 
example of these forecasting techniques. 
A. Accounting identities 
In developing budget forecasts for key sectors we can begin by 
examining several simple accounting identities for decompositions of 
aggregate expenditures. 
Perhaps the simplest is to examine aggregate expenditures as the 
multiplicative sum of per-capita expenditures and total population 
size. 
 
[1] B(t) = b(t) * p(t). 
 
Where B(t) = aggregate budget expenditures at time t  
   b(t) = per-capita budget expenditures at time t 
   p(t) = total population size at time t. 
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We can add more demographic detail by considering age: 
 
[2] B(t) = sum { b(x,t) * p(x,t) } 
 
Where b(x,t) = per-capita budget expenditure at age x and time t 
p(x,t) = population at age x and time t. 
 
We can add socio/economic detail by considering education: 
 
[3] B(t) = sum { b(e,x,t) * p(e,x,t) } 
 
Where b(e,x,t) = per-capita budget expenditures for education e, age x, and time t. 
 
p(e,x,t) = population for education e, age x, and time t. 
 
Any of these accounting identities could be used for forecasting budgets. The population 
components are easily forecast using the models developed in Chapters I and II. The main difficulty 
lies in forecasting the age-specific and education-specific spending components. One solution is to 
assume the budgetary factors remain fixed at their current levels (i.e., b(x,t) = b(x,2005) ). In this 
manner, we can assess the pure effect of the changing demographic components on budget 
expenditures while holding spending rates constant. This is the main method used for this analysis. 
Alternatively, simple forecast rules could be developed for how the budget factors change 
over time. Perhaps the simplest is to assume that these budget factors increase at some fixed rate 
over time. That is, the budget factors maintain their age shape and simply increase in level over 
time. 
 
[4] B(t) = sum { e^(r*t) * b(2005) * p(x,t) } 
 
Where r is the rate of increase over time. r is often taken as the growth rate of labor 
productivity. 
Frequently, per-recipient costs of government programs are assumed to increase at the rate of 
labor productivity growth or wage rate. Payments for many government programs (for example 
U.S. Social Security retirement benefits) are explicitly linked to wages. In addition, salaries are the 
main cost of providing many government programs. For these reasons, we often assume that costs 
per recipient increase as the wage rate increases. Ryan Edwards (2003) provides an extensive 
discussion of such budget accounting identities used in budget forecasts for the United States.  
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B. Budget forecasts for Chile 
Jorge Bravo (2006) has compiled estimates of age-based government transfers in Chile. 
Figure 29 presents the result of this analysis – showing average receipt of government transfers by 
age. In 2004, such transfers accounted for the majority of government expenditures – 64% of the 
total budget.  
 
Figure 29 

























Source: Bravo (2006). 
 
 
Figure 30 presents age profiles of transfers for 4 main categories: Pensions, Education, 
Health, and Employment. Public pensions dominate – accounting for 29% of the total budget. More 
is spent on education (18% of the budget) than health (14%). Spending on employment is relatively 
small (3% of the budget).  
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Figure 30 



















Source: Bravo (2006). 
 
Since pension expenditures are so large for the elderly, it is difficult to distinguish the separate age 
patterns of spending on education, health, and employment. Figure 31 presents a re-scaled version of the 
data. Here we see more clearly the distinctive age patterns of the three non-pension programs. Educational 
expenditures concentrated among the young – especially the elementary and secondary school ages. 
Employment programs are concentrated among the working age population. Health expenditures have a 
characteristic J-shape curve – closely corresponding to the age-shape of mortality. 
 
Figure 31 
AVERAGE GOVERNMENT TRANSFERS RECEIVED 


















Source: Bravo (2006). 
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Holding these age profiles fixed, we can isolate the effects of changing demography on 
budget expenditures using the simple accounting identity: B(t) = b(x)*p(x,t). Figure 32 presents the 
results of the forecast over the next 50 years. In this scenario, population aging leads to significant 
increases in pension expenditures – doubling in the next 30 years and tripling within 50 years. 
Health expenditures are also likely to increase due to demographic forces – but more modestly – 
increasing to 1.5 times current levels within 30 years and 1.7 times current levels within 50 years. 
Employment expenditures would increase by about 15% over the next 50 years. Population aging 
also results in a decrease in education expenditures. These would decline by about 10% over 30 
years and by about 17% over 50 years.  
 
Figure 32 





















Source: Author’s calculations based on Demographic Budget Forecast. 
 
 
Of course, age-specific spending rates are unlikely to remain fixed over time and changes in 
these rates could re-enforce or mitigate these demographic induced changes. Chile’s public pension 
system provides an excellent illustrative example. In 1981, Chile adopted a new joint private-public 
pension system in which workers contributed to their own private retirement accounts (AFP). As a 
safety-net for poorer workers, the government guaranteed to provide a minimum pension (PM) for 
those who contributed at least 20 years to their private accounts in the AFP system. In addition, for 
those who did not contribute for 20 years, the government provides a very small subsistence 
pension (PA). In addition, there are pension systems for the military and police which were not 
privatized in the 1981 reform and continue to function as traditional PAY-GO systems funded out 
of current revenues. At the initiation of the reform in 1981, workers could choose whether to switch 
into the new privatized pension system (AFP) or stay in the old pension system (INP). But all new 
entrants to the labor market (with the exception of the Armed Forces and Police) were placed in the 
new privatized system. As these cohorts age, there is an on-going transition of workers and later 
retirees from the old public system (INP) to the new joint private-public system (AFP+PM+PA).  
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Among retirees, the transition to the new system is just beginning. The vast majority of 
current retirees are receiving benefits paid out from the old INP system. So, the age-profiles of 
pensions used in our scenario forecast mainly reflect these INP payments. It is best to think of our 
forecast as the hypothetical costs that the Chilean government would have incurred had the old pay-
go system continued to function. In the absence of pension reform, population aging in Chile would 
be projected to lead to a tripling of pension costs over the next 50 years.  
Given the pension reform, it is obvious that the government pension costs would be 
substantially reduced as the burden of funding pensions is shifted from public taxes to private 
contributions. The extent of this reduction depends on a complex set of factors which are difficult 
to forecast. As a crude estimate, we might begin by looking at recent estimates of coverage 
provided by the superintendent of the AFP system. Larraín (2005) estimates that about 50% of 
workers will have sufficient funds in their private accounts to fund their own retirements. Of the 
remaining 50% of workers who are in need of government assistance, only 1 in 5 would have the 
necessary 20 years of work in which to qualify for the minimum pension guarantee. The vast 
majority would be in need of a subsistence pension from the government. So, based on these 
coverage estimates we would forecast that under the mature private-public system, 50% of retirees 
would utilize private funds for their retirement (AFP), 40% of retirees would be in need of a 
subsistence pension (PA), and 10% of retirees would qualify for the minimum pension guarantee 
(PM).  
Costs of the new joint private-public system would be substantially lower than the old 
pension system. We can attempt a crude estimation of the savings as follows. About half of workers 
would be funded privately and the half who would need government support would mainly be 
receiving subsistence pensions. We might assume that the average payment per recipient for 
subsistence pension (PA) is 40% of the average payment in the old INP system and those for 
minimum pension (PM) is 70% of the average payment in the old INP system. Therefore, under the 
new mature system, pension costs to the government would be about one-fourth (23% = .50*0 + 
.40*.40 + .10*.70) as high as the old system. In the Private-Public Scenario, the effects of 
population aging would be offset by these changes in benefits – so that rather than tripling pension 
costs would be reduced by 25% relative to current levels. About half of this would be due to 
reductions in coverage and about half due to reductions in payments per recipient.  
We can attempt to model more systematically the transition from the old to new system by 
using the age profile of participants (workers and retirees) in the old INP system. As this cohort 
dies out, the INP budget declines. In a similar manner, the budget costs associated with the 
minimum pension guarantee (PM) and the subsistence pension (PA) would be expected to increase 
as the cohorts who are participants in the new system enter into their retirement years. Figure 33 
presents the forecast for the INP, PA, and PM budgets. As expected, the effects of population aging 
are offset by the changes in rates brought about by the transition to the new private-public pension 
system. This crude analysis could be refined in several ways. It does not consider the payment of 
the outstanding “responsibility bonds” which were issued in response to workers who switched to 
the private system from the public system. When these workers retire, the government issues a 
payment into their private pensions plans (AFP) in recognition of the contributions of these 
workers to the old system. In addition, as noted in Chapter II, the educational composition of the 
Chilean elderly population will change dramatically in the coming decades. Since higher educated 
workers can be expected to have less need for government assistance, this educational shift has 
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Figure 33 
PENSION BUDGET FORECASTDUE TO DEMOGRAPHIC 






















Source: Author’s calculation based on Demographic Budget Forecast. 
 
 
We can also consider changes in the educational budget over time from expansion of the 
educational system. Recall from Chapter 2 that one of our alternative scenarios was to allow 
educational progress to continue on trend. We can derive changes in the age profile of educational 
expenditures by assuming that changes in enrollment rates lead to proportional increases in 
spending by age. I assume those aged 13 to 17 are attending high school and those 18 to 25 are 
attending college. Changes in educational promotion rates (alpha and beta in Chapter II) lead to 
increases in educational spending in those age groups. Because a large fraction of college students 
are attending private colleges, the increases in educational attainment do not lead to very dramatic 
increases in public spending. Nevertheless, the forecast shows that reduction in educational 
spending due to declines in school aged population are offset by funding for increased educational 
attainment. Educational expenditures in 2050 would be at about the same level as educational 
expenditures in 2004 (not accounting for cost increases due to wage growth).  
Four important revisions to the current model would greatly improve its usefulness. First, we 
should explicitly model anti-poverty programs in addition to pensions, education, health, and 
employment. Second, we should allow for policy decisions with respect to the 
expansion/contraction of these programs. Third, it would be useful to provide baseline forecasts of 
program expansion based on UN member country experience. Finally, we should develop a model 
in which cohort-specific changes of rates are easily implemented. We have seen the usefulness of 
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C. Fiscal tax ratios 
The fiscal tax ratio is a convenient measure of the fiscal impact of population aging. Using 
the age profiles of public expenditures (transfers and non-transfers) and the age profiles of taxation, 
we can estimate fiscal tax ratios. That is, we weight the population by the age-profile of 
expenditures to estimate aggregate expenditures of the government. In a similar manner, we can 
weight the population by the age-profiles of taxes to estimate aggregate taxes. The ratio of the two 
gives us the fiscal tax ratio. In the absence of public debt (and public assets), total taxes would 
equal total expenditures. The fiscal tax ratio would always be 1.0. Over time, as the population age 
composition changes, the ratio of tax payers to tax recipients also changes. The changes in the 
fiscal tax ratio can be used to evaluate these population changes in terms of the increases or 
decreases in tax rates necessary to reestablish a fiscal balance.  
Consider the case of Chile. Using data from Bravo (2006), we identify 64% of expenditures 
as having an explicit age component. The other 36% are assigned on a per-capita basis to each age. 
These are expenditures for public goods and services such as police and fire protection, national 
defense, transportation, etc. Figure 34 presents this data. Revenues are collected from many 
sources. Some are collected on sale of national resources like copper. These are not age-assignable 
revenues. Age assignable revenues include things like the tax on consumption (VAT), taxes on 
property, and taxes on income. I do not currently have data on any of these taxes, but instead 
assume for illustrative purposes that taxes are paid in proportion to consumption. 
 
Figure 34 

























Source: Bravo (2006). 
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With these two profiles along with our population projection, we can forecast aggregate 
expenditures and taxes for Chile. This is shown in Figure 35 and it is an evaluation of the 
demographic influences on general government budgets in terms of expenditures and taxes. 
Programs grow or shrink in size only due to changes in demography. The forecast does not consider 
changed in the generosity of programs in terms of who qualifies for benefits or the amount of 
benefit per recipient. Within 30 years, expenditures are 40% higher and within 50 years 
government expenditures would be 70% higher – solely due to demographic effects. On the tax 
side, government revenues are also expected to increase – which will partially offset in the short 
run the increases in expenditures. Within 30 years, tax revenues would be 20% higher and within 
50 years tax revenues would be 25% higher.  
 
Figure 35 




















Source: Author’s calculation based on Demographic Budget Forecast. 
 
 
Figure 36 presents the fiscal tax ratio: the ratio of expenditures to taxes. It is a measure of the 
fiscal pressures due to demographic change. Over the next 15 years, demographic pressures are 
relatively modest – leading to either a 5% increase in taxes or a 5% reduction in benefits. Over the 
50 year horizon, demographic pressure would lead to a 30% increase in taxes or a 30% reduction in 
benefits. As noted earlier, this forecast ignores the transition to the new private-pension system – 
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Figure 36 





















Source: Author’s calculation based on Demographic Budget Forecast. 
D. Economic support ratios  
In a similar manner, we can also construct estimates of the changing ratio of consumers to 
producers as the population ages. Figure 37 presents average consumption and labor earnings by 
age in Chile in 2004 – based on data provided by Bravo (2005).  
 
Figure 37 

















Source: Bravo (2005). 
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Using the probabilistic population forecasts developed in Chapter I, we can derive a 
probabilistic forecast of the Economic Support Ratio (the ratio of producers to consumers). Figures 
38, 39, and 40 present these results for Chile, Brazil, and the United States. 
 
Figure 38 




















Source: Author’s calculations based on Random Country Model. 
 
Figure 39 
ECONOMIC SUPPORT RATIO: BRAZIL, 


















Source: Author’s calculations based on Random Country Model. 
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Both Chile and Brazil have seen a 20% increase in the ratio of producers to consumers over 
the past few decades – indicating that changes in demography have favorably affected the balance 
of production relative to production. Such demographic effects have been referred to as the 
“demographic dividend.” Due purely to the shifting age composition of the population, per-capita 
consumption could have increased by 20% with no additional work effort (or alternatively, work 
effort could have decreased by 20% with no loss in per-capita consumption). Demographic changes 
in the United States were less favorable, but still significant as seen in Figure 40. 
 
Figure 40 






















Source: Author’s calculations based on Random Country Model. 
 
 
But the real impact of the demographic dividend is in the extent to which it might have been 
invested in physical or human capital and therefore helped to fuel subsequent economic growth. In 
addition, the increased demand for wealth which accompanies the increasing amount of time spent 
in retirement can generate a type of second demographic dividend (Mason, 2005) as workers boost 
savings in anticipation of their retirement years. An ambitious, multi-country accounting of the age 
dimension of National Accounts called National Transfer Accounts is current underway (Lee and 
Mason, 2004 and Mason, et al. 2005). This accounting will allow close examination of the 
demographic dividend and how it was allocated – with important implications for understanding 



























CEPAL - SERIE población y desarrollo N° 66 
55 
E. Summary 
This chapter presented a simple model for isolating the effects of changes in population age 
structure on 4 .,/ key social sector budgets: pensions, education, health, and employment. Chile was 
presented as an illustrative example. Other things being equal, population aging would lead to 
significant increases in tax burden – with taxes 30% higher within 50 years. However, other things 
are not expected to be equal. In the case of Chile, the transition to a private-public pension system 
is expected to greatly reduce pension costs and offset the projected increases due to population 
aging. The case of Chile is a cautionary tale. Unlike the models presented in Chapter I and II, 
budget forecasting is an exercise which requires a great deal of country-specific expertise 
concerning policy rules and regulations which govern expenditures. 
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IV. Conclusions 
Three projection models were presented in this article. In 
concluding, I want to emphasize the novel features of these models 
and their possible applications.  
Chapter I presented the Random Country Model population 
forecast based on the collective historical experience of UN member 
countries.  
The model can be easily replicated in all countries. In addition, 
this model could be used for probabilistic forecasts for Latin America 
and other regions of the world or the world as a whole. It would be a 
useful complement to the official UN scenario forecasts. 
Like other stochastic models, it attempts to quantify our 
uncertainty about the future using variation observed in the past. 
Unlike most other stochastic and deterministic models, it 
stresses the common demographic experience of countries – rather 
than the uniqueness of countries.  
Other types of projection models (e.g. budget forecasts) can use 
these Random Country Model probabilistic population forecasts as 
model inputs in order to measure the impact of our uncertainty about 
the future population. 
Comparison of UN scenario forecasts with the probabilistic 
forecasts based on the Random Country Model showed that the UN 
scenario forecasts are considerably more pessimistic about future 
longevity gains than past experience would indicate. In addition, there 
is considerable variability in immigration rates which are not reflected 
in UN scenario  forecasts. Therefore, the two biggest surprises that  
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countries will likely face are (1) a larger than expected elderly population and (2) shifts in 
immigration levels (from high to low and from net exporter to net importer). 
Chapter II presented a forecast of the educational composition of the population by age and 
sex based on educational attainment data from a single census. 
The model can be easily replicated in all countries for which we can obtain educational 
attainment by age. The data burden is considerably reduced by relying on a single census – rather 
than attempting to obtain trends in educational enrollment rates over time from multiple sources. 
If census data are available for other years, the model could be used to construct a very long 
historical time series of the educational distribution of the population. 
The changing educational distribution of populations throughout the world over a 
considerable time period could be calculated using this model. 
Such changes in educational distribution would be useful in their own right as measures of 
social progress but additionally would be important inputs into economic growth models. 
It would be interesting to observe the extent to which the rapid economic growth observed in 
some regions in the world in the 1980s and 1990s were the product of “an educational dividend” 
rather than a “demographic dividend.” The window of opportunity accompanying the surge in the 
working age population as a share of total population known as the “demographic dividend” is 
already rapidly closing in Latin America and now represents a lost opportunity. On the other hand, 
the window of opportunity from a surge in the highly educated working-age population is just 
beginning to open in Latin America. 
Chapter III presents a model for forecasting budgets of key social sectors, as well as the 
impact of demographic changes on taxes (fiscal tax ratio) and on general economic well-being (via 
the economic support ratio). 
It is easy to assess the relative impact of demographic change on government budgets, other 
things being equal. The difficulty lies in assessing these demographic impacts in the context of 
changing age-specific rates. The case of the pension transition in Chile serves as a cautionary tale – 
pointing out the difficulty involved and the need for expert country-specific knowledge about 
policy rules and regulations. 
Despite such difficulties, it is important to continue to develop these models since population 
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